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Ectosomes from platelets, endothelia 
and leukocytes are discharged directly 
into the blood where they can release 
their content rapidly or persist in 
the circulation for quite some time. 
Ectosomes discharged to the tissue 
intercellular space can also release 
their content there, remain trapped 
locally or diffuse some distance. Effects 
are triggered when ectosomes (or 
their released molecules) reach their 
targets, often in cell types distinct 
from the cells of origin. Released 
molecules activate key cell-surface 
molecules, such as receptors and 
enzymes. Intact ectosomes can either 
fuse with target cells (with the ensuing 
incorporation of their membrane in the 
plasma membrane and release of the 
segregated package to the cytosol) 
or be taken up by endocytosis. The 
fate of the latter is variable: fusion with 
lysosomes; release of contents in the 
cytosol; or discharge to the extracellular 
space by transcytosis (Figure 1). 
What is the role of ectosomes in cell 
biology, physiology and pathology? 
Ectosomes are specific, multi-purpose 
carriers that expand the borders of 
cells away from the plasma membrane, 
establishing communication networks 
by which specific properties and 
information can be shared among 
cells. By delivering their molecules at 
distance without dilution or degradation 
they reproduce effects otherwise 
induced by direct cell–cell contact, 
playing major roles in the integrated 
functioning of tissues and organs. 
Digestion of the intercellular matrix 
by metalloproteinases activated by 
ectosomes can induce profound 
changes to the cell environment. 
Fusion of ectosomes at the surface 
of target cells delivers exogenous 
antigens, enzymes and other proteins to 
discrete sites of the plasma membrane. 
Concomitantly, release of the 
segregated protein/RNA packages to 
target cells can alter gene expression. 
This might explain, among other 
events, the functional and phenotypic 
changes taking place in stem cells 
without transdifferentiation, sustained 
by genetic information transferred from 
tissue cells via ectosomes. Conversely, 
transfer of genetic information from 
stem cells to target cells may redirect 
altered functions, inducing repair of 
damaged tissues without replacement 
of parenchymal cells. The heterogeneity 
of ectosomes can play different, even 
opposing roles. Ectosomes containing 
cytokines, in particular interleukin 1b, 
are pro-inflammatory; others, however, 
are anti-inflammatory. Monocyte and 
endothelial ectosomes are often rich 
in tissue factor, a potent activator 
of the coagulation cascade, and 
can therefore trigger coagulation, 
thrombosis and also angiogenesis. 
Platelet ectosomes, however, contain 
low levels of tissue factor, and 
therefore work differently. Ectosomes 
derived from leukocytes and platelets 
have profound effects on innate 
immunity and also on the induction 
of adaptive immunity, reprogramming 
macrophages and dendritic cells toward 
immunosuppression.
What about ectosomes and disease? 
Great interest has been raised by 
the increased levels of endothelial 
ectosomes in the blood of patients 
affected by acute coronary syndromes, 
atherosclerosis and stroke, a finding 
now considered for the development 
of new diagnostic tests. Ectosomes 
of specific origin are also being 
studied as a target of new therapies 
for rheumatoid arthritis and multiple 
sclerosis, where ectosomes are 
believed to promote inflammation and 
cell death, and for cancer, in which 
ectosomes play a role in invasion 
and metastasis. The mechanisms of 
the effects on cancer are multiple. In 
addition to the above-mentioned roles 
in digestion of the intercellular matrix 
and immunosuppression, ectosomes 
can induce the horizontal transfer 
among tumor cells of critical molecules 
such as proteins (e.g. P-glycoprotein 
(which confers multidrug resistance to 
the cells), glutaminase, and fibronectin), 
mRNAs and miRNAs. This transfer is 
considered to be greatly important for 
cancer progression. 
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The ability to anticipate is a hallmark 
of cognition. Inferences about what 
will occur in the future are critical 
to decision making, enabling us 
to prepare our actions so as to 
avoid harm and gain reward. Given 
the importance of these future 
projections, one might expect the 
brain to possess accurate, unbiased 
foresight. Humans, however, exhibit a 
pervasive and surprising bias: when it 
comes to predicting what will happen 
to us tomorrow, next week, or fifty 
years from now, we overestimate 
the likelihood of positive events, 
and underestimate the likelihood of 
negative events. For example, we 
underrate our chances of getting 
divorced, being in a car accident, or 
suffering from cancer. We also expect 
to live longer than objective measures 
would warrant, overestimate our 
success in the job market, and 
believe that our children will be 
especially talented. This phenomenon 
is known as the optimism bias, and 
it is one of the most consistent, 
prevalent, and robust biases 
documented in psychology and 
behavioral economics. 
The optimism bias is defined as 
the difference between a person’s 
expectation and the outcome that 
follows. If expectations are better 
than reality, the bias is optimistic; if 
reality is better than expected, the 
bias is pessimistic. The extent of 
the optimism bias is thus measured 
empirically by recording an 
individual’s expectations before an 
event unfolds and contrasting those 
with the outcomes that transpire. This 
methodology reveals, for instance, 
that students expect to receive higher 
starting salaries and more job offers 
than they end up getting. People 
tend to underestimate how long a 
project will take to complete and how 
much it will cost. Most of us predict 
deriving greater pleasure from a 
vacation than we subsequently do, 
and we anticipate encountering more 
positive events in an upcoming month 
(such as receiving a gift or enjoying a 
movie) than we end up experiencing 
(Figure 1A). Across many different 
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consistently report that a large 
majority of the population (about 80% 
according to most estimates) display 
an optimism bias. Optimistic errors 
seem to be an integral part of human 
nature, observed across gender, race, 
nationality and age. 
Optimistic biases are even reported 
in non-human animals such as rats 
and birds. To study optimistic biases 
in birds, Matheson and colleagues 
(2008) taught European starlings 
to press a red lever whenever they 
heard a short (2 second) auditory 
tone in order to receive an immediate 
reward (positive outcome), and 
a green lever when they heard a 
long (10 second) auditory tone to 
receive a delayed reward (this is by 
comparison a negative outcome 
as birds prefer immediate reward). 
Colour-reward-tone associations 
were counterbalanced. They then 
tested them by presenting a medium 
length auditory tone. The birds were 
motivated to press the correct lever, 
because if they made a mistake they 
would not receive a reward at all. The 
results reveal that a large percentage 
of birds showed a bias towards 
pressing the lever associated with an 
immediate reward, suggesting that 
they expected a positive outcome 
although there was no objective 
reason to do so. Interestingly, birds 
that were kept in small cages without 
access to water baths and toys did 
not show optimistic tendencies. 
Their actions indicated that their 
expectations were unbiased rather 
than optimistic (in response to a 
medium length tone they pressed 
the green lever on only 50% of the 
trials). Comparable results have 
been reported in mice by Harding 
and colleagues (2004) using a similar 
paradigm, indicating that positive 
biases are shared by multiple other 
species. 
There is, however, at least one 
group of humans who fail to show 
positively biased expectations — 
individuals suffering from depression. 
Strunk et al. (2006) have shown 
that while healthy humans expect 
the future to be slightly better than 
it ends up being, people with mild 
depression show no bias when 
predicting future events, and people 
with severe depression tend to 
expect things to be worse than they 
turn out (Figure 1B). Thus, while 
optimistic biases are common in the 
majority of humans, optimism seems 
to break down in major depression 
disorder (MDD), with pessimism being 
one of its key symptoms according to 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM IV). 
The puzzles of unrealistic optimism
The prevalence of the optimism 
bias presents two puzzles. First, it 
is not obvious how optimism can 
be maintained in the face of reality. 
Second, it is unclear whether and 
why it would be adaptive to hold an 
optimism bias. Much recent work on 
optimism has addressed these two 
issues.
The maintenance and breakdown  
of optimism 
Standard theories of learning hold 
that people adjust their expectations 
when faced with disconfirming 
information. One puzzle of optimism 
is thus that people maintain overly 
positive expectations despite a 
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Figure 1. Optimism bias in healthy individuals and lack of optimism bias in depression.
In two studies participants were asked to predict the likelihood of different life events that 
might occur to them in an upcoming month (such as receiving a gift, burning dinner, getting 
stuck in traffic). At the end of the month they reported back which events had occurred. 
(A) Healthy individuals predicted positive events to be more likely than negative or neutral 
events. However, in reality the likelihood of positive, negative and neutral events to occur was 
equal (Sharot and Dudai, cited in Sharot 2011). (B) Greater pessimism bias was associated with 
depressive symptoms as measured by BDI-II scores (bias is measured as the difference 
between predicted and actual likelihood of positive events and the reverse for negative 
events). Individuals scoring low on depression symptoms showed an optimism bias (dark grey), 
individuals showing no bias in either direction were mildly depressed (light grey), and individu-
als exhibiting a pessimism bias scored high on depression symptoms (white). Adapted with 
permission from Strunk et al. (2006).
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Figure 2. How optimism is maintained in the face of reality. 
(A) When given desirable information about the future (such as learning that the likelihood of 
suffering from cancer is lower than anticipated) people updated their belief to a greater degree 
than when receiving undesirable information (such as learning that the likelihood of suffering 
from cancer is greater than anticipated). This difference was related to how well regions of the 
frontal lobe tracked estimation errors (that is, the differences between prior beliefs about the 
future and information presented). (B) Activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus was correlated 
with the extent of errors that resulted from positive information equally well in highly optimistic 
individuals and people low on optimism. (C) In the right inferior frontal gyrus activity correlated 
strongly with negative errors in people low on optimism, but less so in highly optimistic indi-
viduals (trait optimism is measured independently by the LOT-R scale). Adapted with permis-
sion from Sharot et al. (2011).
is increased functional connectivity lifetime of experience with reality. 
There are many empirical examples 
of this resistance to alter optimistic 
expectations. For instance, 
highlighting previously unknown risk 
factors for diseases is surprisingly 
ineffective at altering peoples’ 
optimistic perception of their medical 
vulnerability. And although people 
are aware that divorce rates are 
nearing 50% in the Western World, 
couples who are about to get married 
estimate their own likelihood of 
divorce as negligible. Even experts 
show startlingly optimistic biases; 
divorce lawyers underestimate the 
negative consequences of divorce, 
financial analysts expect improbably 
high profits, and medical doctors 
overestimate the effectiveness of 
their treatment. 
Recent findings from our lab 
provide a mechanistic explanation of 
these observations. We have found 
that an optimism bias is maintained 
in the face of disconfirming 
evidence because people update 
their beliefs more in response to 
positive information about the 
future than to negative information 
about the future (Figure 2A). We 
asked participants to estimate their 
likelihood of encountering different 
aversive events in their lifetime (such 
as Alzheimer’s disease and burglary) 
and then presented them with the 
average frequency of encountering 
those events. We next asked them to 
estimate their likelihoods once again 
in order to test whether they used 
the information provided to update 
their beliefs. We found that when 
individuals received information that 
was worse than their estimate (for 
example, when someone estimated 
their probability of suffering from 
cancer as 10% and then learned 
that the average probability was 
30%) they did not update their 
estimate much the second time 
around. However, if a person initially 
provided an estimate that was more 
pessimistic than the information 
they were subsequently given 
(for example, estimated their own 
probability of suffering from cancer 
at 40% and then learned that the 
average probability was 30%), they 
substantially updated their estimate 
to more closely match the average 
probability. Selectively updating 
beliefs in response to positive 
information produces optimism that is 
resistant to change.This selectivity is mediated by 
a failure of frontal lobe regions to 
code errors in prediction that would 
reduce positive expectations. When 
optimistic individuals are confronted 
with unexpected statistics about the 
likelihood of encountering negative 
events, their right inferior frontal 
gyrus exhibits reduced coding of 
information that calls for a negative 
update (Figure 2C). In particular, 
individuals who score high on a 
scale measuring trait optimism 
have a weaker correlation between 
activity in this region and the extent 
of negative errors in estimation. But 
when the information presented is 
better than expected, regions of the 
prefrontal cortex code for it efficiently 
both in highly optimistic and less 
optimistic individuals (Figure 2B). In 
other words, while coding for positive 
information about the future is 
intact, optimism is tied to a failure in 
updating from (and diminished neural 
coding of) undesirable information 
regarding the future. 
Although selective updating in 
response to positive information is 
consistently observed in healthy 
populations, this pattern seems to 
be abolished, and even reversed, in 
people suffering from depression. It 
is possible that efficiently updating one’s beliefs in response to negative 
information contributes to a 
pessimistic outlook that may result 
in the low mood characteristic of 
depression. The causation, however, 
could point in the opposite direction: 
low mood could cause depressed 
individuals to attend to negative 
information about the future that is 
congruent with their current affective 
state. Further work is needed to 
untangle these mechanisms. 
An absence of optimism in 
depressed individuals may also 
relate to how future scenarios are 
mentally constructed. When healthy 
people imagine their future they tend 
to form positively biased scenarios, 
imagining positive events (such as 
winning a professional award) in 
more detail and as closer in time than 
negative events (such as losing a 
large sum of money). Mentally, people 
‘approach’ positive future scenarios 
and distance themselves from 
negative ones. We have shown that 
this bias is associated with increased 
activation of the amygdala (involved 
in emotional processing) and rostral 
anterior cingulate (rACC, involved 
in emotion regulation) when people 
imagine positive future events relative 
to negative events. Furthermore, there 
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healthy individuals imagine positive 
scenarios relative to negative ones. 
We suggest that the rACC contributes 
to optimism by biasing attention 
and vigilance towards positive 
associations and emotions when 
imagining the future. Intriguingly, 
it is precisely these regions — the 
amygdala and the rACC — that show 
abnormal function and impaired 
connectivity in depressed individuals. 
Further links between depression 
and (a lack of) optimism come from 
the notion that optimism relates to a 
person’s belief in their control over 
future outcomes. Overestimating 
ones’ control over events is thought 
to increase optimism, because 
people believe that if they have the 
ability to control future outcomes 
they can steer themselves in the right 
direction. While healthy individuals 
tend to overestimate the extent 
of control they have over events, 
depressed individuals do not show 
this tendency. Seminal work by 
Martin Seligman (2006) suggests 
that learning that one does not have 
control over the environment can 
induce depression. He has shown 
that when an animal is exposed to 
an environment in which actions do 
not influence outcomes, it quickly 
begins to show signs of depression. 
Seligman coined the effect “learned 
helplessness” and showed that, 
even after being transferred to an 
environment in which the animal 
can in fact determine outcomes, the 
animal assumes helplessness and 
fails to commit the actions needed to 
avoid negative outcomes.
Is optimism optimal?  
Given that the healthy brain exhibits 
mechanisms that create optimistic 
beliefs, one can ask the teleological 
question of why this is. While 
classic theories in economics and 
psychology assert that correct beliefs 
will maximize reward and minimize 
loss, many sources of evidence point 
to the conclusion that optimism is 
nonetheless advantageous compared 
to unbiased predictions. 
As discussed above, the absence 
of positive expectations of the future 
is associated with mild depression 
and anxiety, suggesting that optimism 
is vital to mental health. However, 
optimism is also beneficial for 
physical health. All else being equal, 
optimists live longer and are healthier. The effects can be quite substantial, 
with one survey of 97,000 individuals 
reporting that optimists are 14% less 
likely to die between the ages of 50 
and 65, and 30% less likely to die 
from cardiac arrest. Optimism has 
also been related to extended survival 
time of cancer and AIDS patients. 
Optimism affects physical health 
in at least two ways. First, expecting 
positive outcomes reduces stress 
and anxiety. This is beneficial given 
that chronic stress is detrimental to 
health, causing over-activation of the 
autonomic nervous system and the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical 
axis. Optimists have been reported 
to catch fewer infectious diseases 
and have a stronger immune system. 
Second, it has been suggested that 
optimism facilitates health-promoting 
actions. For example, studies show 
that optimistic patients are more 
likely to eat healthily and engage in 
exercise. It seems that the belief in 
recovery motivates the individual to 
act in ways that promote it. 
Optimism appears to be related 
to success in the professional 
domain as well. Duke economists 
Puri and Robinson (2007) report 
that optimists work harder and 
longer hours, which may account for 
their higher pay. Indeed, optimism 
has been linked to achievement 
in education, business, sport and 
electoral politics. In a recent paper, 
Johnson and Fowler (2007) present a 
computational model suggesting that 
overestimating one’s probability of 
success is advantageous in a world 
of uncertainty and competition. They 
suggest that if contested resources 
were sufficiently valuable compared 
to the costs of competing for them 
during human evolutionary history, 
humans would have evolved a bias 
to overestimate their likelihood of 
success.
In a recent review, McKay and 
Dennett (2009) conclude that 
optimistic illusions are the only group 
of misbeliefs that are adaptive. While 
this may indeed be the case, it is 
important to note that excessive 
optimism can also be hazardous. 
Underestimating risk may reduce 
precautionary behaviour such 
as safe sex, attending medical 
screenings or buying insurance. It 
could potentially promote harmful 
behaviours such as smoking, over-
spending, and unhealthy eating due 
to the optimistic assumptions that unwanted future outcomes (such as 
lung cancer, bankruptcy and obesity) 
are unlikely to materialize and that 
positive future outcomes (such as 
earning larger amounts of money) 
are. Indeed, it has been reported that 
extreme optimists are more likely 
to smoke and less likely to save 
money than are mild optimists. These 
behaviours have traditionally been 
attributed to temporal discounting 
(overvaluing the present over the 
future), but studies show that when 
optimistic expectations are abolished, 
these behaviours are reduced. This 
suggests that choosing to engage in 
an act that is rewarding at present 
but costly in the future (smoking, 
unprotected sex, overeating) can be 
partially explained by an excess of 
unrealistic optimism.
The harmful influences of over-
optimism likely extend to the 
collective behaviour of groups. For 
instance, the optimism bias has 
been named by several economists 
as one of the core causes of the 
financial downfall of 2008. Unrealistic 
expectation of individuals, financial 
analysts and government officials 
that the market would continue 
growing, despite evidence to the 
contrary, likely contributed to the 
collapse. This example may be 
indicative of a trend in which the 
negative consequences of optimism 
are especially pronounced in the 
modern world. There are two reasons 
why this might be. First, models 
of predictive bias (such as that of 
Johnson and Fowler) hold that the 
extent of unrealistic optimism should 
increase with uncertainty. People will 
show the largest bias in situations 
with the greatest unknowns. The 
modern world presents us with many 
such situations — whether we are 
dealing with unfamiliar cultures (for 
example, in political relations) or novel 
technologies (for example, internet 
and financial markets), modern life is 
rife with circumstances in which over 
optimism is likely to arise. Second, 
the modern world has increased 
interactions between larger numbers 
of individuals. Individuals’ biases that 
are inconsequential on their own can 
accumulate together to produce a 
large bubble, such as in the case of 
the 2008 financial market fall. 
On balance, however, it seems that 
the benefits of unrealistic optimism 
may have outweighed the downfalls. 
The biologists Ajit Varki (2009), Danny 
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single-blind randomised experiment, 
34 healthy naïve volunteers (21 
females; mean ± SD age = 22.6 ± 2.5 
years) underwent bilateral histamine 
applications under two different 
conditions. The RHI was induced in 
seated participants using the usual 
method [2]. After the illusion was 
established, participants closed their 
eyes. The skin was pricked (1 mm 
standardized point) at standardized 
locations on the volar aspect of both 
arms. Histamine, and antigen and 
saline controls, were applied to both 
arms. Both forearms and the rubber 
arm were covered with a tissue so 
the participant could not see the 
topical reactions. Participants then 
opened their eyes. The illusion was 
reestablished every three minutes 
by 20 seconds of synchronous 
stroking. For the control condition, 
we also stroked for 20 seconds every 
three minutes. The vividness of the 
illusion was monitored subjectively 
using Item 3 of the established 
questionnaire [2], which is known to 
correlate tightly with proprioceptive 
drift, a behavioural index of the 
illusion’s vividness [6]. We confirmed 
this tight correlation in our pilot study 
(see Supplemental Information).
After ten minutes, the equipment 
was dismantled and a separate 
investigator, who was blinded 
to condition, arm and applied 
substance, entered the room, marked 
the area of induration with a felt 
pen, and photographed it from a 
standardized location 35 cm above 
the midpoint between the wrists of 
the participant. Room lighting and 
camera zoom were fixed. Both arms 
were in the one image. The size of 
the wheal was measured by two 
investigators, who were also blinded 
to subject, condition, arm and applied 
substance. Participants returned 
10 ± 7 days later to perform the 
second condition of the experiment. 
The experimental arm (left or right) 
and the order of conditions were 
randomized.
Histamine always caused a wheal 
response, but the size of the wheal 
depended on the arm involved and 
on the experimental condition. That 
is, the wheal was bigger on the 
experimental arm during the illusion 
than it was on the control arm 
during the illusion or on either arm 
during the control condition (arm x 
condition interaction (F(1,30) = 4.9, 
p = 0.034; post-hoc p < 0.05 for all; 
The rubber hand 
illusion increases 
histamine reactivity 
in the real arm
N. Barnsley1,2, J.H. McAuley1,2,  
R. Mohan1,2, A. Dey1,2, P. Thomas2,3, 
and G.L. Moseley1,4
Most people are convinced that their 
body parts are in fact their own, but in 
some clinical conditions, this sense of 
ownership can be lost [1]. Perceptual 
illusions, most famously the rubber 
hand illusion (RHI) [2], demonstrate 
that a sense of ownership over a body 
part (or an entire body [3]) that is not 
in fact ours can be easily induced in 
healthy volunteers. But does illusory 
ownership over an artificial body 
part have consequences for the real 
body part, the one that has been 
‘replaced’? Recent data show the 
RHI induces a small but robust drop 
in skin temperature of the real hand. 
That is, blood flow to the ‘disowned’ 
hand seems to be selectively reduced 
[1]. Such a finding is particularly 
relevant to the immune system 
because a primary role of the immune 
system is to ‘discriminate self from 
non-self’ [4]. We predicted that 
the innate immune system may be 
upregulated in a manner consistent 
with rejection of the replaced hand. 
Consistent with this prediction, we 
report here that the RHI increases 
histamine reactivity, which is a key 
final pathway of the innate immune 
response and has been implicated 
in autoimmune disorders, including 
multiple sclerosis [5]. Our finding has 
direct implications for autoimmune 
disorders and a range of neurological 
and psychiatric conditions 
characterised by a disrupted sense 
of ownership over one’s body (see 
[1] for a list of conditions), and has 
broader implications that extend well 
beyond previous assertions about the 
mind-body link. 
We undertook an initial pilot study 
that showed elevated histamine 
reactivity, measured by the size of the 
flare response, when the histamine 
was applied in conjunction with the 
RHI (see Supplementary Information 
for details). In the subsequent 
CorrespondencesBrower and others have argued that the evolution of mankind might have 
come to a halt without optimistic 
illusions. With the emergence of 
conscious foresight (the ability to 
imagine one’s future) came the 
devastating understanding that old 
age, sickness, decline of mental 
power, and oblivion await. Varki and 
Brower reason that this awareness 
on its own would have interfered 
with our daily function, bringing the 
activities needed for survival to a 
stop. However, if conscious foresight 
evolved alongside optimistic illusions, 
it would not have become an 
evolutionary psychological barrier.
Conclusion
Research on the optimism bias 
suggests an important divergence 
from classic approaches to 
understanding mind and behaviour. It 
highlights the possibility that the mind 
has evolved learning mechanisms 
to mis-predict future occurrences, 
as in some cases they lead to better 
outcomes than do unbiased beliefs. 
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